In our view, there is a tangible shift towards creating new platforms in the sphere of economic cooperation, including in such areas as connecting BRICS financial markets infrastructure, platforms for cross-border payments, depositary infrastructure, platforms for cooperation of BRICS Special Economic Zones (SEZs), BRICS Grain Trade Exchange. On BRICS expansion, while the declaration promulgated the endorsement of the modalities for BRICS new Partnership category (para 5), there were no specific criteria or country membership details – this is likely to be picked up by Brazil next year during its BRICS chairmanship.

The Declaration affirms BRICS growing support for the BRICS+ format (para 4) and states the bloc’s commitment to BRICS institutional development (para 5). The latter may imply some move towards increased institutionalization of the bloc in the coming years, possibly through the greater support to the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and the institutionalization of the BRICS CRA.

As in earlier such declarations, the BRICS have expressed support to the WTO as the core of a rules-based multilateral trading system (para 9). There is also a specific mention of the BRICS Informal Consultative Framework on WTO issues – a sign of further movement to coordinate BRICS trade policy agenda within the WTO. The BRICS also state their support for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that is at the center of the Global Financial Safety Net of the world economy (para 11), with calls for expanding the share and the representation of the Global South in this international financial organization. There is also support accorded to the G20 as a key platform that brings together the leading economies of the developed and the developing world (para 14).

With respect to the NDB (para 62) as expected the BRICS leaders call for greater use of national currencies in its operations, while also expressing support for the expansion in the Bank’s membership and financial operations across the developing world. As regards the BRICS CRA (para 68) our sense is that the Declaration lacked concerted measures to transform this platform into a more institutionalized and operational facility for BRICS/BRICS+ economies; we note, however, that the inclusion of provisions on the need to upgrade the BRICS CRA facility may be a positive sign of a gradual movement in the direction of its greater role in supporting developing economies.

On financial market infrastructure and cross-border settlements (para 65), the Declaration commits to discussions and evaluation of the feasibility of creating independent settlement and depositary infrastructure. This essentially implies that the BRICS are still at the stage of discussing the modalities of these platforms – including in terms of the overall concept and the countries that are to participate fully in these initiatives (the Declaration explicitly refers to these initiatives being pursued on a voluntary basis). The concepts in this area presented this year may serve as a basis for further work by BRICS in the coming years, with the overall time-horizon (baseline scenario) for the implementation of these initiatives likely spanning several years.

Platforms for economic cooperation featured prominently in the Declaration, with the platform for Special Economic Zones having the potential to develop into a broader platform for cooperation among the regions/municipalities of BRICS economies (something that BRICS+ Analytics highlighted as a possible option back in 2023). The creation of the BRICS Grain Trade Exchange and the reference to possible extensions of such efforts into other sectors could be indicative of the greater proclivity of developing economies to extract more dividends from their resource endowments via greater policy coordination and market infrastructure development.

In summing up we note that the important initiatives launched in the area of economic cooperation explicitly allow for a differentiated implementation of these measures, leaving them open to be pursued on a voluntary basis – this essentially broadens the possibility for the implementation of new initiatives amid growing membership. At the same time, we also note that some of the key themes in BRICS economic cooperation did not receive as much prominence in the final document. This concerns such potentially important tracks as BRICS trade liberalization, BRICS single currency and the cooperation among the Central Banks of BRICS economies in the sphere of CBDC inter-operability. We expect some of these tracks to be more actively pursued during Brazil’s BRICS presidency in 2025.